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POLICY BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
REFLECTIONS ON REREADING PROFESSOR LORENZEN'S
ESSAYS
FOWLER V. HARPER t
THE publication by Ernest G. Lorenzen of a selection of his essays
on the Conflict of Laws I makes appropriate a fresh consideration of the
philosophic bases of a field of American law whose growth from a barren
formalism to a fruitful discipline is in large measure attributable to
Professor Lorenzen's penetrating analysis and reflection. For a third
of a century, as these essays eloquently testify, little has happened in
this area of legal activity which has failed to attract Professor Lorenzen's interest and attention. His own contributions vary from intensive studies in highly technical segments of the Conflict of Laws to
those broader considerations of policy and method which give great
impetus and direction to scholarly activity.
A good deal of twentieth century water has gone over the Conflicts
dam. Not only has scholarship in the United States reached a level
never theretofore attained, but revolutionary ideas have been born,
the ultimate effect of which it is still difficult to predict. In the vanguard of all such activities has ever been found the patient, meticulous
and searching mind which Professor Lorenzen brings to bear upon the
problems with which he grapples. On any showing, his must be included in the slender volume which contains the names of great American legal scholars.
Few have done so much to bring within the range of American legal
vision the purposes and objectives of the Conflict of Laws and certainly
no one has contributed more to the increasing awareness of the American bar of the basic technical difficulties involved. Professor Lorenzen's
familiarity with foreign systems of law has made it possible for him to
enrich his own work by utilizing the studies of continental jurists whose
insight into many problems far exceeded that of most American writers
of the era. For practical purposes, it was Professor Lorenzen who first
introduced into American legal thinking the subtle problems involved
in the renvoi and the theory of qualification. Almost forty years ago
his first article on renvoi appeared in the Columbia Law Review. 2 A
decade later this was followed by his first discussion of the problem of
qualification. 3 It is an amazing fact that problems so basic hod reIVisiting Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
1. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CoNxCr r LAWS (1947).
2. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Forcign Law, 10 CoL.L.
Rv. 190, 327 (1910), followed in 1918 by The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws

-Meating of "The Law of a Country," 27 YA. L. 3. 509 (1918).
3. Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws 20 CoL. L.
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ceived substantially no attention from American writers on the Conflict of Laws, although the renvoi had been dealt with in English law
more than a half century before. 4
Professor Lorenzen's analytical mind has enabled him to grasp fully
the fundamental character of the difficulties involved in the renvoi and
in qualification and their far-reaching significance in connection with
the attainment of the uniformity of legal consequence which is assumed
to be the primary objective of this branch of the law. The extension
of knowledge about these problems and the relative degree of sophistication of the present generation of law students and writers I are results largely of the momentum given by Professor Lorenzen to the investigation of such matters. His interest in every aspect of foreign
systems of the Conflict of Laws together with his intensive work in
connection with the renvoi and qualification entitle Professor Lorenzen
to credit for laying the basis of an American comparative law of Conflict of Laws, I a field which will certainly attract the attention of many
able scholars of the future.
Perhaps his greatest contribution to the subject of which he is a
master is the work which Professor Lorenzen shared with his distinguished colleague, Walter Wheeler Cook. I These two were pioneers
REv. 247 (1920), followed by The Qualification, Classification or Characterzatiot Problent in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L. J. 743 (1941).
4. Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt. Ecc. 855 (1841), discussed by Lorenzen, The Renvoi
Theory and the Applicatio!&of Foreign Law, 10 COL. L. REv. 327 (1910).
5. Since Professor Lorenzen's first article on renvoi, a considerable number of
learned articles have appeared in the legal periodicals, including: Coox, THE LoGIC.
AND LEGAL BASES OF CoNFLicT OF LAwS c. IX (1942) ; Bates, Remission and Transuns.
sion in; Aerican Conflict of Laws, 16 CORN. L. Q. 311 (1931) ; Bentwich, Recent Ap-,
plication of the Renvoi in Matters of Personal Status, 14 CAN. B. REv. 379 (1936);
Cheatham, International Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 CotN. L. Q. 570
(1936); Cook, "Characterization"in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE L. J. 191 (1941) ;

Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization,Localization and Preliminary Question. in the Conflict of Laws, 14 So. CALiF. L. R-v. 221, 387 (1942); Cowan, Renvoi Does not Involve
a Logical Fallacy, 87 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 34 (1938); Falconjjridge, Rcnvoi and the Law
of The Domicile, 19 CAN. B. Rlv. 311 (1941); Falconbridge, Bills of Lading: Proper
Law and Renvoi, 18 CAN. B. REv. 77 (1940); Falconbridge, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 CAN. B. R-v. 369 (1939) ; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws: Examples
of Characterization,15 CAN. B. REv. 215 (1937); Falconbridge, Renvol and Succession
to Movables, 46 L. Q. Rav. 465 (1930), 47 L. Q. REv. 271 (1931); Griswold, In Reply
to Mr. Cowan's Views on Renvoi, 87 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 257 (1939); Griswold, Renvoi
Revisited, 51 HARv. L. Ray. 1165 (1938); Meriggi, Conflicts of Law--A Theoretical Application, 14 B. U. L_ Ry. 319 (1934) ; Pascal, Characterization as an, Approach to the
Conflict of Laws, 2 LA. L. Rv. 715 (1940); Robertson, Survey of the Characterization
Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 52 HARv. L. Rzv. 747 (1939); Schreiber, The Doctrine
of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 31 HAav. L. REv. 523 (1918).
6. See Rheinstein, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Gertnany, 2 U. oF
CHL L. RFv. 232, 257 ff. (1932).
7. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. 3.
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in outlining an approach to the baffling mysteries of the Conflict of
Laws which has proved to be of the greatest significance. It was here
that they played such an important part in the growing maturity of
American Conflict of Laws thinking during the last quarter of a century. Their work hastened the evolution of the Conflict of Laws from
a mechanical, over-simplified machine to a body of legal principles incorporating some of the most profound of our notions of social policy.
A striking example of this new maturity of thought is to be found
in the current technique of the Supreme Court in dealing with the problems of jurisdiction over foreign corporations, as compared v.ith the
formulary method formerly employed. "It is evident that the criteria
by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which
justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not,
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely,
as has sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, is
a little more or a little less. Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose
of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts,
ties or relations.
"But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection
of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise
to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of it or are connected with the activities within a state, a procedure which requires
the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in
most instances, hardly be said to be undue." 8
Occasional references, from time to time, are made to the various
policies reflected in the rules of Conflict of Laws and the values underlying those policies, but all too little is done about it. Policy analysis
is a science as yet in its infancy in our jurisprudence. It is submitted
that American Conflict of Laws has now attained that stage of development which constantly demands critical consideration and analysis of
the policy factors involved.
In the first place, it should be observed that the modem approach
to the Conflict of Laws is not a chaotic, anti-rational method as some
have appeared to think. I The alternative to a hard and fast system of
736 (1924); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Lawo, 33 "A. L 3.
457 (1924).
8. Stone, C. J., in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
9. de Sloovere, The Local Low Theory and Its Implications in the Conflict of Laws,
41 HA~v. L. Rnv. 421 (1928).
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doctrinal formulae is not anarchy. The difference is not between a
system and no system, but between two systems; between a system
which purports to have, but lacks, complete logical symmetry and one
which affords latitude for the interplay and clash of conflicting policy
factors.
It is unnecessary to demonstrate again the many particulars in which
the orthodox system of Conflict of Laws causes trouble. The anomalies
are many and outstanding and inconsistencies in attitude of the best
jurists not uncommon. 10 So keen a mind as that of Holmes, for all of
his juristic iconoclasm, conceived of an omnipresence brooding over
Mexico 11 which he denied elsewhere. This repudiation, however, in
more than one instance was more verbal than real. He presumably accepted the "place of making" rule for determining the validity of contracts 12 without consideration of the Herculean efforts necessary to
lift oneself by the boot-straps of one's major premise. 13 Both Professor
Lorenzen and Professor Cook have sharply pointed up some of the major fallacies involved in classic American thought as applied to the
problems of the Conflict of Laws. 14
10. Note the inconsistent inarticulate premises involved in the following: "New
York will not recognize as a model for any liability which she will impose, a liability
imposed by another state upon an absentee non-resident. This is another question from
whether the result would be too violent a departure from New York mores for New
York to tolerate. Moreover, it is basic in the whole subject that legislative jurisdiction,
of which this is an instance, is territorial, and that no state can create personal obligations against those who are neither physically present within its boundaries, nor resident
there, nor bound to it by allegiance." L. Hand, J. in Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F. 2d
367, 368 (C.C.A.2d 1938).
11. Slater v. Mexican N.R. Co. 194 U. S. 120 (1904).
12. See Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412 (1917), and Polson v. Stewart,
167 Mass. 211, 45 N. E. 737 (1897).
13. The notion that the "place of contracting" is the proper point of reference to
govern the contract is patently a question-begging one when applied to problems of the
"validity" of the contract. The determination whether a contract is valid is a determination whether there is or is not a contract. The rule that the validity of the contract is
determined by the law of the place of making is actually a rule that validity is determined by the law of the place where, if there turns out to be a contract, it is made. This
chasing oneself around a circle results from a failure to recognize that the question of
determining where a contract is made is a legal problem upon which the laws of the
various states may differ to an extent quite as great as in respect to any other problem,
The problem, therefore, is itself a problem of the Conflict of Laws although one which
is logically preliminary to other problems which may arise in a dispute over such a transaction. If the law of some particular state is to be adopted, a question of qualification
is raised. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws purports to solve the matter by reference to the "general law" of contracts (see Section 311, Comment d). Thus the "general law" of contracts is employed to determine where a particular contract is "made"
after which the law of the place of "making" is employed to determine whether there
is any contract at all. All this has been exposed by Professor Cook, THE LoGICAL AND
LEGA BASES OF CONFLICr OF LAWS, 365 (1942).
14. See the articles cited in note 7, supra.
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In considering the policies involved in Conflict of Laws disputes,
one is immediately confronted with what is perhaps the major assumption of the entire subject. The objective of the rules of Conflict of Laws
is to attain uniformity in legal relations regardless of the forum in which
litigation occurs. It is thought to be intolerable that legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities and their correlatives should vary from
state to state. 15 It is not immediately apparent, however, -%ihy it
should necessarily be so and very little critical examination of the proposition has been made.
One may concede certain inconveniences and embarrassments in
connection with a situation where legal results depend upon the choice
of forum. It does not follow, however, that such a situation necessarily
produces shocking injustices or an outraged sense of public morality
in all cases. Had Mr. and Mrs. Williams remained in Nevada to enjoy
the marital bliss with which that state had endowed them, few would
have been shocked at the contemplation of what the prosecuting attorney and judge in Caldwell County, North Carolina, could or might do
to them in the event they should make the mistake of returning there
to live. There must have been many thousands of spouses in the interval between Iaddock 16 and Williams -17who avoided a criminal record
only by the intelligent generosity of prosecuting attorneys or by their
own good sense in the selection of a home. After all, it is not easy to
perceive why a man should not select the state whose domestic law, favors his family enterprise just as he selects the site of his business with
a view to the tax laws which are most favorable thereto. Moreover,
as against the advantages of uniformity must be balanced the desirability of latitude for states with divergent ideas to establish their
own patterns of community life and standards of domestic behavior.
"Granted that ... there are cogent reasons for having a divorce decree equally good or equally bad everywhere," says Professor Powell, 1s
"this is but one side of the shield. There is a question whether t,;o
score and more of states not wholly devoid of civilized ideals should
be deprived of power to determine for themselves the marital status
of persons who by any common-sense human criterion are undeniably
their own people." So too it may be supposed that the states should
have the power to fx the grounds upon which the marital status may
be altered by divorce and the length of residence necessary to qualify
as litigant under such laws. 19
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 NV. VA. L. Q. 156 (1931).
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REv. 930, 936 (1945).
"In the absence of a uniform law on the subject of divorce, this Court is not so
limited in its application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that it must force Neadas
policy upon North Carolina, any more than it must compel Neevada to accept North
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It is at this point, too, that one is confronted with the perplexing
problems of renvoi and qualification. Attainment of uniformity in
legal relations requires uniformity in Conflict of Laws rules, a common
system of classification of legal rules and uniform characterization of
legal ideas. Obviously we have none of these requirements, oeven in the
United States, nor are we likely to approach any of them in the forseeable future.
It may be that a crazy-quilt pattern for handling renvoi in some

situations and an ad hoc treatment in other situations will produce what
appears to be uniformity. Illustrative of the first technique are certain
problems in connection with marriage and property. 20 Illustrative of
the second technique is the manipulation by the English court of the

renvoi application. 21 This could in no sense be accepted as a universal
principle since obviously the reverse of the usual renvoi result would
follow. Instead of perpetual motion to and fro between the two competing laws, there would be no motion whatever from one to the other
since neither law could be applied until the application of the other
law were known. 22 In general, it must be admitted that the logic of
the renvoi as a suiper Conflict of Laws rule to eliminate the conflicts of
ordinary Conflict of Laws rules does not hold water.
Notwithstanding these considerations, there are many cases in which
Carolina's requirements. The fair result is to leave each free to regulate within its
own area the rights of its own citizens." Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Williams v,

North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 311 (1942).
20. See Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The
CONrLICr OF
Law of a Country," 27 YALE L. J. 509, 530 (1918). See RESTA IMENT,
LAws §§ 7-8 (1934).
21. Compare the manipulation of the doctrine by the English court in In re Annesley
[1926] 1 Ch. Div. 692 with the handling of it in In re Ross [1930] 1 Ch. Div. 377.
The Annesley case involved the validity of a bequest of personalty made by an English testatrix whose domicile at death, according to English law, was in France. An
English court applied the renvoi doctrine and looked to the totality of French law. It
found that the French Conflict of Laws rule also applied the doctrine of renvol, accepting
the remission in cases like the present one and applying the internal law of France. The
English court followed the peregrinations of the French law and likewise applied the internal law of France. Thus by three references the English court caught up with the
French law and arrived at the same result which presumably would have been reached by
a French court on the facts of the case.
In the Ross case, the English court was presented with a similar problem involving
a testamentary disposition of movable property of an English testatrix who died domiciled in Italy. Here again the English court so adapted its version of the renvol as to
come out at the same place which an Italian court would presumably reach. The English court looked to the entire Italian law and finding that the Italian law rejected the
doctrine of renvoi and looked only to the internal national law of the decedent, it accepted
the remission and applied English law to the problem.
22. Not dissimilar is the statutory provision which required that when two trains
approached an intersection, each was to come to a stop and neither proceed until the
other had crossed the intersection.
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at least formal uniformity is attainable. Many states do have the same
Conflict of Laws rules for particular problems. So too, many states
have sufficiently similar systems of classification and sufficiently broad
methods of characterization to embrace large numbers of situations
from which legal disputes arise and thus make formally possible their
uniform treatment. Although many cases cannot be solved in terms of
the principal objective of the Conflict of Laws, there are many others
which can be so solved. As a policy consideration, therefore, uniformity cannot be ignored.
It is suggested that a permissible initial step in a Conflict of Laws case
would be a consideration of the extent to which uniformity is possible
in the particular dispute. 23 If, for any reason, the problem turns out
to be one incapable of solution in these terms, the court might properly
accommodate its decision to other policy considerations. It is not easy
to understand why a court should regard itself as limited to a particular
Conflict of Laws rule in a situation where uniformity as the principal
end and objective of Conflict of Laws cannot be attained. This is particularly true, of course, where other social policies press hard for recognition.
Perhaps next in order of generality, is the policy of selecting the
most significant contact or contacts as a guide to the governing law.
This is important both as a matter of fairness to the litigants themselves and to the communities involved. Every society develops standards of fairness and justice which in many respects are peculiarly local.
So too, each community works out criteria for the administration of
its internal social and economic problems which differ in many important particulars from the criteria evolved in other communities. When
two or more communities are touched or affected by a factual sequence,
the nexus should be considered with a view to the respective interests
of the societies affected by the particularfact situation. The particular situation should be stressed because not always are communities
affected equally although connected with a problem by a nexus characterized in the same way. It is obvious that there are domiciles and
domiciles. A middle western community may have a negligible interest in the domestic affairs of a citizen who spends practically all of his
time in New York although he votes and pays taxes and even becomes
a candidate for the presidency of the United States as a citizen of the
former community. Indeed, there is little which could be said for a
state in such a case imposing its ideas of family life upon the community
in which the parties in fact live. On the other hand, a state may have
a very profound concern in the compensation of a local worker, notwithstanding the fact that its connection with the employment and
23. Compare Cook's discussion of In re Ross, supra note 21, Tnm LoIcz
LEAL BAsEs OF TMS Co .ucror LAws 242 (1942).

A,M
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with the injury is otherwise slight. Once we are emancipated from the
restrictions of notions of territoriality and take proper account of this
important policy factor, it ceases to be disturbing that California law
should be applied to compensate a workman for injuries received in
Alaska where the entire employment took place. 24
If the interest of states connected with the problems is taken thoroughly intoaccount, it might conceivably lead to a completely different analysis and solution of difficult Conflict of Laws problems involving torts. Most tort problems are relatively easy of solution because
all the facts which give rise to the dispute occur in one state although
the litigation may occur in a different state. The difficult question is
present when the relevant operative facts occur in more than one state.
When the acts of the defendant take place in State X and the plaintiff is hurt in State Y, it has been generally assumed that a choice must
be made between the laws of X and Y to govern the rights and liabilities of the parties. But on reflection it appears that there is little if
any logical or policy basis upon which such a choice can be made. The
usual analysis is by no means persuasive. It is argued that negligent
conduct does not create liability until injury proximately results therefrom. The result is supposed to follow that the law of the state of injury where the last event necessary to liability occurred must govern
the problem. 25 But this solution is obviously superficial. It does not
readily appear why the chronological order of events should have legal
significance. In the very nature of things, of course, a man must act
before he can hurt anyone, or if the question involves liability for nonaction, the significant nonaction must necessarily precede the injury.
But conduct as well as injury is a condition to liability. And while it
is true, as is sometimes argued, 21 that no liability can arise unless an
injury occurs, it is equally true thatthere can be no liability for injuries
sustained unless there is tortious conduct on the part of the defendant.
The question still remains, what law shall determine the issue of tort
or no tort.
From the point of view of factual happenings, it would appear that
if one and only one law must be selected, there is little basis for choice.
Take a hypothetical case. Defendant engages in conduct in State X
which is prohibited by statute for the purpose of protecting other per24. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).

25. Alabama G.S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892); Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 381, 13 S.W. 1092 (1890); Otey v. Midland Valley R.R., 108 Kan.
755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921); Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109 (1875); Chicago, St.
Louis & New Orleans KR. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977 (1883); Connecticut Valley Lumber
Co. v. Maine C.R. Co., 78 N.H. 553, 103 Ad. 263 (1918); Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio
489 (1848); Centofanti v. Pennsylvania MR., 244 Pa. 255, 90 Atl. 558 (1914); Dallas
v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936).
26. GooDicir, CoxNF¢cr OF LAws 222 (1938).
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sons. Defendant's conduct causes emotional shock and consequent
physical injury-not actionable in X-to plaintiff in State Y, where
such injury is actionable but where conduct like the defendant's is not
illegal. It is clear that State X has a paramount interest in controlling
and regulating the conduct of persons within its borders. - It is equally
clear that State Yhas a paramount interest in protecting persons within
its borders and affording them redress in the event of their legal injury.
If we are not restricted by orthodox notions, a sensible solution of
this problem might be somewhat as follows: State X's concern w.ith behavior might very properly be recognized by a finding of negligence
per se under X law, notwithstanding the fact that such conduct would
be lawful under Y law. Similarly, Y's policy of protecting individuals

against invasion of this type of interest in personality might very well
be recognized, notwithstanding the fact that under X law emotional
shock with consequent physical injury does not receive legal protection.
To be sure, this would subject an actor to liability in the case supposed,
whereas had the entire matter been exclusively an X or a Y episode,
there would have been no liability at all. But this is merely saying that
in certain circumstances there may be an "interstate tort" under circumstances which would involve no liability as an "intrastate" tort.
Although the result might appear anomalous on first thought, there
should be nothing surprising in the suggestion that the combination of
the relevant policies of two states might bring about a legal result which
would not be obtained under the policy of either one of them alone.
Nor is there any patent reason why a defendant in such circumstances should complain. If, contrary to law, he creates in one state
an unreasonable risk of hurting people in another state in such a way
as to be contrary to the law of that state, he might very well ex.pect
liability to be imposed upon him by a court of either state or of a third
state. So long as his conduct causes no extrastate results, he may properly expect to be subjected only to the law of the state involved. But
when he involves himself in a situation affecting two states which have
legitimate concern therewith, he should not be surprised if liability is
imposed under the law of both states.
The importance of the factual contacts is heightened in proportion
to their accumulation in one of two or more states involved in the problem. If one such contact is sufficiently significant to give a state an
appropriate interest in the legal result, additional contacts increase the
state's concern as compared to that which other states may have in the
outcome of the situation. The classical technique, therefore, of employ27. Not only does the state of action have an interest in the prophylactic function
of tort law, but it may be presumed to have an interest in determining the character of
conduct which will subject the actor to liability to others, without as vell as within the
state, so long as the acts take place within its borders.
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ing a single contact as the point of reference for the governing law would
seem to be of dubious validity. The number as well as the character of
the contacts might well be considered in making the choice of law.
It is worth observing what many courts have for years in fact done
in situations where several contacts converge in one locality, particularly in cases involving the validity, construction and effect of contracts. A very good case indeed can be made both argumentatively
and precedent-wise against identical treatment of the case where nothing happened in a state except the execution and mailing of a document
and the case where everything concerning the contract happened in
the state except the litigation. The accumulation of contact points in
one state argues mightily for the application of the law of that state.
Frequently and traditionally courts have disguised what they do by
the language employed. The ficititious "intent of the parties" has often
concealed a choice dictated by a policy which calls for the law of that
state having the most intimate connections with the factual context
of the legal problem. 25 But courts are becoming increasingly aware of
28. See Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932). "'The circumstances
under which contracts of this kind [affreightment] are usually made preclude a careful
consideration by the shipper of their language and effect.' And for this reason, as was
suggested upon the argument, the question of intent can hardly be said to involve the
actual mental operations of the parties," Adams, "J.in Grand v. Livingston, 38 N.Y.
Supp. 490, 493-4, 4 App. Div. 589, 595 (4th Dep't 1896).
The "intention" theory has long been recognized as a treacherous formula and it is
difficult to explain its tenacity and popularity otherwise than by the general policy of
the law to allow the parties the maximum latitude in effecting their mutual intention.
The Supreme Court of the United States undoubtedly gave extensive currency to the
doctrine that the validity of a contract, as Chief Justice Marshall put it, "is governed by
the law with a view to which it was made." Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 48
(U.S. 1825). The principal weakness of the rule, aside from those raised by Professor
Loren.en concerning the delegation of the law-making power to the citizen [See
LORENZEN, Validify and Effect of Contracts it;the Conflict of Laws in SELECTED ARTicis ON THE Co FmcT OF LAws 282 (1947)], is revealed by the various "presumptions" to which courts have been compelled to resort and the vagueness of the terms in
which the rule is so frequently cast. [See, e.g., SaORy, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNrmcr OF LAws 376 (8th ed. 1883) and Mathews, J. in Prichard v. Norton, 106 U. S.
124' (1882).] Moreover, the general policy is defeated in situations where the parties'
expressed "intention" is disregarded because they selected the law of some state which
had no factual connection whatever with the transaction or the parties. See Owens
v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows, 58 R. I. 162, 192 Atl. 158 (1937). As a logical matter,
it would seem that such a limitation on the "intention" rule is indefensible. If the courts
are willing to allow the parties to select their own law, why should it be necessary that
.they select the law of a state which has some factual connection with their bargain or
bargaining? Actually, the limitation of the rule argues for its abandonment. If it be
important that the state whose law is to govern the contract have some factual connection with it, why should the contract not be governed by the law of the state which
has the most significant factual connection therewith?
Dicey, who, in general, supports the "intention" theory, finds it necessary to deal
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this device and it is not surprising, therefore, to find a judge removing
the mask and exposing the actual operations of the juristic mind. Barber Company v. Hugzes 29 isworthy of attention as an interesting treatment of a Conflicts problem.
An Indiana partnership was indebted to a Delaware corporation
licensed to do business in Illinois with its principal office and place of
business in Chicago. The indebtedness had been incurred by the purchase of petroleum products practically all of which had been delivered
in Illinois. One of the partners made several trips to Chicago to negotiate a settlement of the account. An agreement was finally reached for
part payment in cash, the balance by a negotiable note. A few days later
the corporation prepared a note payable to itself, or order, in Chicago
and mailed it to the partners. The partners signed the note, mailed it
to the obligee who upon receipt thereof applied it to the settlement of
the claim. Subsequently a default judgment was taken in Illinois by
confession pursuant to a cognovit provision in the note. Action was
then brought on the judgement in Indiana. By Indiana law, it is unlawful to execute a cognovit note although such instruments are valid
in Illinois. Under Indiana law, cognovit clauses are unenforceable but
the law is otherwise in Illinois. The court discussed the several rules
and contrariety of opinion concerning the law governing the validity of a contract. It concluded that "if the place of execution and the
place of performance and the place whose law was intended by the
parties to control were one and the same, there is no problem." The
place of performance was indisputably Illinois. The trial court had
found, as a fact, that the parties intended the transaction should be
governed by the law of Illinois. The place of making, however, vas
troublesome. After discussion of the place-where-the-last-act-necessary-to-make-a-binding-agreement-takes-place formula, and a somewhat dubious analysis, 11 the court concluded, that the "place of makwith this aspect of the problem although his disposition of it is hardly satisfactory. "No
one can maintain that persons who really contract under one law can by pretending that
they are contracting under another law render valid an agreement which that law treats
as void or voidable. What is contended for is that the bona fide intention of the parties
is the main element in determining what is the law under which they contract" Diczw,
Comrucr op LAws 965 (5th Ed. 1932). Aside from the vagueness of the expressions

"law under which they contract" and "bona fide intention," the statement is open to the
objection that it is not apparent why the parties may not "pretend they are contracting

under another law" and thus "render valid an agreement" if, as he states, the intention
of the parties is "the main element" in determining what law is to govern the transaction.

29. 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E. 2d 417 (1945).
30.

The court took the position that the contract was "made" in Illinois because the

'last act" consisted of the payee "applying" the note in "settlement" of the preexisting
indebtedness.

"The findings compel the conclusion," it was said, "that the account was

to be closed and satisfied by acceptance of the note in Illinois, which thus became the
place of execution. This accords with the theory of the Negotiable Instruments Law
that there is more to delivery than parting with possession. The delivery must be 'for the
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ing" was Illinois and so reached the conclusion, "there is no problem".
For reasons which do not appear in the opinion, however, the matter
was not thus concluded to the satisfaction of the court. It embarked
upon a still further analytic enterprise. "In view of the unsatisfactory
state of the decisions, both in Indiana and other jurisdictions, and as
a test of the correctness of our conclusion that the validity of the note
and its cognovit clause must be determined by the law of Illinois, we
resort to a method used by modem teachers of the Conflict of Laws in
rationalizing the result obtained by the courts in decided cases. So far
as we know it has not been formulated by any court into a rule, but if
one 'were attempted it might be stated as follows: The court will consider all acts of the parties touching the transaction in relation to the
several states involved and will apply as the law governing the transaction, the law of that State with which the facts are in most intimate
contact.... Looking for the contact points in the present case we observe first that the parties were at all times engaged in purely business
transactions. They transacted this business almost exclusively in Illinois. The place of their conferences to arrive at a settlement was in
Illinois. The note was payable in Illinois. It was on an Illinois form.
It was prepared in Illinois. It was valid in that State and was there to
be performed. It was actually intended that Illinois law control, as
expressly found by the court. On the other hand the only contact
points with Indiana were the residence of the debtors, their signing of
the note in Indiana and their placing it in the mail in Indiana. Considering all of these circumstances it is impossible to escape the conclusion
that the transaction centered in Illinois and that its law should be applied to the note and the judgment taken thereon in the Municipal
Court of Chicago." 31
It must be admitted that the selection of the law of the state which
represents the conflux of many contact points harmonizes with a certain
sense of appropriateness to a far greater degree than the selection of a
state merely because of the quasi-localization there of a legal conception. It is this propriety in selecting the state having the most significant connections with the significant acts of the parties which satisfies
the sense of fairness to the individual parties. It seems hardly fair to
any one to apply the law of Illinois to a transaction between two New
Yorkers, every aspect of which took place in New York, including the
litigation, merely because one party forgot to mail the letter of acceptance until he arrived in Chicago to attend a convention. 32 Moreover,
purpose of giving effect' to the instrument. That purpose under the facts found herein
would not be satisfied by the mere mailing in Indiana." 223 Ind. 570, 585, 63 N.E. 2d

417, 423.
31. Id. at 585-7, 63 N.E. 2d at 423-4.
32. On the frequently accidental character of the place of contracting, see Lorenzen
and Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 555, 573

(1935).
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the use of the law of the state which has the important fact contacts
avoids many perplexing questions with respect to the identification of
the place of contracting or the place of performance, including the problem of qualification, 33 to say nothing of the artificial presumptions necessary to manipulate the "intention of the parties" rule.
Perhaps in cases involving workmens' compensation, the grouping
of several contact factors as pointing to the appropriate law to govern
the problem is most evident. Thus, we find frequent consideration
given the residence of the employee, the place of entering the employment, the place where the workman was injured, and the general area
of his activities. 14 A wider use of this technique would undoubtedly
result were more stress placed upon the legitimate interests of the several states involved and their policies with respect to the particular
problem in question.
That sensitiveness to a state's connection with a situation and interest in it is a fundamental consideration is indicated by the fact that
frequently on this basis judicial action is restricted on the one hand 35
33. The complexities involved here are illustrated by the whimsical handling of the
problem in Dater v. University of Chicago, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N. W. 175 (1936). The
Michigan court was confronted with the case of a married woman who had executed a
promissory note in Michigan together with a trust deed for Illinois land to secure it.
The instruments were mailed to the plaintiff in Chicago who paid the money thereon in
Chicago. Under Illinois law a married woman could contract such an obligation but not
under Michigan law. The court assumed that the Michigan Conflict of Laws rule referred to Illinois as the place of contracting. But under Illinois law, in circumstances
like those at hand, the contract would have been regarded as a Michigan contract, governed by Michigan law. The court thereupon applied the Michigan law and held the note
void.
Analysis of this performance suggests that the court applied its own law to solve
the preliminary problem of qualification and thus looked to the law of the state vhere,
under Michigan law, the contract was made. It then tried to handle the case just as an
Illinois court would handle the very case in hand. It applied the doctrine of renvoi. But
in thus applying the law of Illinois in its totality, it included the Illinois qualification of
the legal concept of "place of maing" and by a circuitous route ended up precisely
where it started. The anomalous aspect of the case consists of first applying its own law
to solve the problem of qualification and thereafter applying the opposite rule of the foreign law to the same problem. The case is discussed by Griswold, Rcn'oi Rcdsitcd, 51
HAsv. L. REy. 1165 (1938) and by Coo, op. cit. supra note 13, at 246.
34. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, -94 U.S. 532 (1935);
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Colo. 280, 61 P.2d 1033 (1936) ; Cameron v. Ellis
Const'n Co., 252 N.Y. 394, 169 N.E. 622 (1930); Chambers v. District Court, 139
Min. 205, 166 N.W. 185 (1918) ; McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
212 Wis. 507, 250 N.W. 396 (1933); Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerrard, 201 Wis. 474,
230 N.W. 622 (1930).
35. For example, the forons non convenicns cases: Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 828 (1947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 67 Sup. Ct. 839
(1947) ; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933). And consider the cases
prohibiting injunctions against actions in the courts of a sister state under the Federal
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or compelled on the other. 11 Constitutional mandate may limit choice
of law to states with a legitimate connection with the problem and
sometimes, indeed, to the single state which has an overriding interest
in the outcome. 17 A court may not escape its constitutional obligations
by an exaggeration of what it regards as the policy of its own state nor
by the application of an automatic rule which assigns a fictitious situs
to a legal conception. 11 The "place of making" may reflect a limited
state interest in one case or, when considered with other connections,
a constitutionally compelling one in another. On the other hand, a
state may, if its own policy requires and its connections with the transaction justify, decline to enforce or respect rights acquired under the
law of another state. 9 In fashioning its techniques for determining
choice of law, one state must appraise its own interests and those of
other states within the margin of error allowed by the Supreme Court.
Indeed, to insure against the subversion by one state of the policies of
others is one of the important duties of the highest court in the land.
Another policy not to be ignored is that which requires an affirmative
decision in the maximum number of cases of certain classes, This is
notably true as a commercial policy where the validity of negotiable
documents is involved. The policy is an institutional one throughout
the field of commercial law. Innumerable technical rules reflect such a
policy. Thus, protection of the interest of the holder in due course of
a negotiable document is called for in all but the most extravagant
cases. The financial structure of the nation is founded upon the assumption of the validity of such documents. Countless transactions
every hour of the business day testify to this assumption. The performance of many courts in searching for a state whose law will uphold
the instrument is an adaptation of this policy to Conflict of Laws prob-

lems.

40

Employers Liability Act. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 137 Ohio St. 409, 30
N.E. 2d 982 (1940), affirmed 314 U.S. 44 (1941) (power of state court to enjoin
prosecution of suit in the Federal court of another state) ; Miles v. Illinois Centr. R.R.,
315 U.S. 698 (1942) (power of state court to enjoin suit in state courts of another

state).
36. See the formn non conveniefs case: Williams v. Greene Bay & W.R.R. 326
U.S. 549 (1946).
37. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Hartford Accident & Ins. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1931); Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925).
38. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, supra, note 37; Aetna Life* Ins.
Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357

(1918).
39. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach,
313 U.S. 498 (1941).
40. "The general principle in relation to contracts made in one place to be performed in another is well settled. They are to be governed by the law of the place of
performance and if the interest allowed by the law of the place of performance is
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Equally strong is society's interest in upholding the validity of conduct on the part of its members which they treat as establishing the
marital relation. It is frequently desirable to give legal sanction to
the existence of a family notwithstanding the unconventional tactics
employed by the principals in creating it. For a century the tendency
in the field of family law has been to reduce the area of illegal conduct
and its unhappy socio-biological results. 41 Indeed in a few states bastardy has been abolished except by the magic of Conflict of Laws
rules. 42 Logic has been sacrificed in the interest of an enlightened
notion of justice and a more liberal social policy. It was disappointing,
therefore, when the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommended legislation which placed a higher premium on geographical
uniformity than on the elimination of meritricious relations. 43 It was
encouraging, however, that so few communities accepted the recommendation. 44The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act represented a pecuhigher than that permitted at the place of contract, the parties may stipulate for the
higher interest without incurring the penalties of usury. The converse of this proposition
is also well settled. If the rate of interest be higher at the place of the contract than
at the place of performance, the parties may lawfully contract in that case also for the
higher rate." Miller v. Tiffany, 1 Wall. 293, 310 (U.S. 1864). With this rule, compare the
cases in which the rate of interest at the residence of the debtor has been used to uphold
the validity of the instrument. Scott v. Perlee, 39 Ohio St. 63 (1883) ; Dugan v. Lewis,
79 Tex. 246, 14 S. NV. 1024 (1891). And consider Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194
(1867), in which the rate at the situs of land mortgaged to secure the note saved it
from invalidity. For a further statement of the policy of the Supreme Court in upholding negotiable instruments wherever a plausible Conflict of Laws formula is available,
see Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U. S. 403 (1927).
41. Illustrative is the spread of legislation saving the legitimacy of the issue of technically bigamous marriages and other void or voidable marriages after a decree of nullity.
Mfore than three-fourths of the states have legislation thus mitigating the harsh logic
of the common law. The statutes are collected and discussed in 1 VmU% AtrrAcAnz
FA.mmy LAws § 48 (1931). See also 4 id. § 247. A number of states have legislation
legitimating the issue of slave and Indian marriages. Id. § 243.
42. An Arizona statute provides that "every child is the legitimate child of its natural
parents." ARz. R-v. CODa 1928, § 273. See also N. D. Comp. Laws 1913, § 5745.
43. The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, as approved and adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws in 1912, provided: "If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state shall go into another
state or country and there contract a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws
of this state, such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this state with the
same effect as though such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state." A
reciprocal provision declared: "No marriage shall be contracted in this state by a party
residing and intending to reside in another state or jurisdiction if such marriage would
be void if contracted in such other state or jurisdiction and every marriage celebrated in
this state in violation of this provision shall be null and void."
44. The Act was enacted only in five states: Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont and Wisconsin. It was withdrawn from the active list of Uniform Acts recom-
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liar insulation to modem developments in the field of family law. It
reflected over-emphasis upon uniformity and an under-evaluation of
current social values. It is difficult to appreciate the advantage in a
rule of law which makes children illegitimate in all states because they
are illegitimate in one. 41 The symmetry of the law is thus maintained
but the lives of children badly hurt. It must have been a source of some
comfort to Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix while they were serving their
jail sentence in North Carolina that there was at least one state where
they could subsequently live and rear a family, if they so desired, as
respectable members of the community. 11
Perhaps one of the most significant criteria to be recognized in the
development of Conflict of Laws is the respect to be accorded to the particular policies embodied in the domestic rules of law involved. The
Conflict of Laws is in a sense secondary law. It exists solely because
of a divergence of domestic laws which have some claim to application.
Although in some classes of cases, the Conflicts rule may be regarded
as primary in the sense that the Conflicts policy involved is paramount,
there are countless cases in which the Conflicts policy may be of less
importance than that involved in the possibly applicable domestic
rules. This is probablytrue, generally, within the area in which a state
has a constitutionally free choice of law. Rules of contract law reflect
community policies concerning the acquisition of wealth and future
economic protection. Rules of tort law reflect community policies for
salvage, the administration of economic losses and the protection of
other social values. Rules of property law embody social policies with
mended for adoption by the states at the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1943.
45. The National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws sought to avoid some of the

evils which would have resulted from widespread adoption of the Uniform Marriage
Evasion Act by recommending in 1922 a Uniform Illegitimacy Act which obtained only
seven adoptions (Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, New York
and Wyoming), none of which was a state which had adopted the Uniform Marriage
Evasion Act. It is to be obser-ved that although but five states adopted the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act, a number of other states have legislation on the subject of one
sort or another.
46. The majority opinions in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), leave
it uncertain whether Nevada is permitted to regard the couple as man and wife although
at least one of the dissenting justices appears to think that Nevada is left free by the
decision to do so. "The Nevada decree," says Mr. Justice Rutledge (1d. at 247),
"was valid and remains valid within hdr borders." See the discussion of this phase of
the decision by Powell, supra note 18, at 937 ff. On the whole, it seems more rather
than less probable that she who was imprisoned in North Carolina as Mrs, Hendrix
could continue to be regarded by Nevada (and presumably by third states) as Mrs. Williams.
47. As for example, the rule of res judicata of jurisdictional issues, backed by the
full faith and credit clause [American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1933)
where the policy of putting an end to litigation takes precedence over all other policies].
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respect to the retention, transmission and distribution of wealth. These
and other branches of the law disclose community values and a way of
life. When a court is confronted with a Conflict of Laws case imbodying
such legal problems, it may, along with other policy considerations,
properly evaluate the policies reflected in the competing rules. Indeed,
it may be urged that any permissible approach to such a problem inescapably requires such an appraisal. In other and in blunt words, the
court's responsibility embraces a consideration of the relative societal
value of the rule which it is asked by a litigant to apply. To be sure,
this makes the role of the tribunal in a Conflict of Laws situation more
difficult, but it may be proper to attribute the added difficulty to the
complexity of the problem rather than the method for solving it. It is
always easier to apply a rule of thumb than to exercise a judgment, but
slot-machine law frequently produces bad results.
Limitations of the traditional analysis are nowhere more dramatically emphasized than in a situation where it results in defeating the
policy of the internal law of both of two states involved. Suppose a
child is born illegitimate, domiciled with his father in State X. The
father dies leaving land in State Y. An X statute provides that illegitimate children shall inherit from the father whenever they have been
recognized in writing by him as his children. A Y statute provides for
the legitimation of children who have been recognized in writing by
their father. The X child is recognized in writing by his father. Nevertheless the X statute is inapplicable because it is a statute of inheritance
rather than legitimation and the law of the situs of the land governs
inheritance. 48 Similarly, the Y statute is inapplicable because it is a
statute of legitimation and the law of the domicile governs legitimation. 41 Thus the child is unable to inherit and the policy of both X and
Y is defeated. It seems clear that an appropriate regard for the policy
of the competing laws as distinguished from their technical characterization and selection should have been made and the opposite result
reached. "0
48. Pfeifer v. Vright, 41 F.2d 464 (C.C.A. 10th 1930).
49. Eddie v. Eddie, 8 N.D. 376, 79 N.W. 856 (1899).
50 Compare McCausland's Estate, 213 Pa. 189, 62 At. 7S0 (1906) where the court
regarded as "of similar import" a statute at the domicile that "illegitimate children shall
inherit the same as those born in wedlock, if the parents subsequently intermarry" and a
statute at the situs, that "where the father and mother of an illegitimate child shall enter
into the bonds of lawful wedlock and cohabit, the children shall thereby become legitimated and enjoy all the rights and privileges as if they had been born during the wedlock of their parents." Compare also Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P. 2d 643
(1945) where a California statute of legitimation was applied to permit a child to share
in his father's estate in California, although the legitimating acts had occurred while the
child and father had been domiciled in another state. Compare also It re Wchr's Estate,
96 Mont. 245, 29 P. 2d 836 (1934) in which an illegitimate child was permitted to inherit
in Montana regardless of where or when the legitimating acts occurred.
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On the nature and character of the policy of the internal rule of law
will often depend its applicability to an interstate situation and thus
the key to the solution of a Conflict of Laws problems. A New Hampshire case illustrates the point. 61 The court of that state had before
it an action to foreclose a mortgage on New Hampshire land. The mortgage had been executed in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts married
woman to secure her husband's debt. Such a transaction was valid by
"Massachusetts law" but not by the "law of New Hampshire." The
trial court ruled that "the validity of the mortgage should be determined by the laws of New Hampshire" and ordered the bill dismissed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire also held that the
law of the situs of the land governed the problem but held the raling
below to be in error. What was "the law of New Hampshire" as applied to the situation before the court? "What the law is," observed
Judge Branch, "with reference to a conveyance of New Hampshire real
estate executed in another jurisdiction by a married woman there domiciled, as surety for her husband, has never been specifically decided." 11
The court thereupon examined the pertinent statute, searched for the
purpose sought to be achieved and the policy promoted and concluded
that the rule of law had no relation to conveyances by Massachusetts
wives or indeed by wives of any state other than New Hampshire.
"The primary purpose of the statute," it was said, "was not to regulate
the transfer of New Hampshire real estate, but to protect married
women in New Hampshire from the consequences of their efforts, presumedly ill-advised, to reinforce the credit of embarrassed husbands."
As soon as it was perceived that the New Hampshire law reflected a
policy of "protective incapacity" for married women rather than a land
policy, the problem was solved. No one would suppose that New
Hampshire had embarked upon a crusade of knight-errantry to protect all the married women in the country from improvident husbands.
The object of legislative concern obviously was limited to the ladies of
New Hampshire.
A similar approach might very well be made, as has been suggested, 13 to the problem of whether a married woman can qualify as
a plaintiff in a tort action against her husband, as where a New Hampshire wife was hurt in an automobile accident in Maine resulting from
the alleged negligence of her husband who was driving the car at the
time. 14 If the Maine domestic relations law prevents such an action
but the internal law of New Hampshire permits it, which law should
51. Proctor v. Frost, 89 N.H. 304, 197 At. 813 (1938).
52. Id. at 306, 197 At. at 814.
53. Griswold, Rcnvoi Revisited, 51 HmAv. L. REv. 1165 (1938), as to which see Professor Cook's criticism, THE LoGicAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 248 if.
(1942).
54. Gray v. Gray, 87 N. H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (1934).
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be controlling? Under the rule that the place of injury governs, the
Maine law is applicable, wherever the forum. But what is the Maine
law, as applied to suits in New Hampshire between New Hampshire
spouses? If, as may be assumed, the policy of the Maine law is to prevent domestic discord, 11 it seems clear that Maine's concern with
New Hampshire families is negligible. Maine, presumably, would be
entirely content to allow married couples from other states to be governed, even in the Maine courts, by the law of the state which does
have a justifiable interest in their domestic welfare. The same result
may be reached, for the same reasons, by following Professor Cook's
"short cut" to the solution. "If . . . we take notice of the fact that

the problem of whether a wife shall be allowed to sue her husband is a
question of policy falling in the field of domestic relations, it seems
reasonably clear that the question of policy is one for the law of the
domicile rather than that of the 'place of wrong'." " What appears
to be a fallacious appraisal of the policy factors involved in such a case,
led the New York Court of Appeals to the opposite conclusion in an
action in New York by a New York wife against her husband for injuries received in a Massachusetts automobile accident. 1 Under the
family law of Massachusetts, she could not sue her husband although
the New York law was otherwise. Recovery was not allowed. After
invoking the Conflict of Laws rubric that the law of the 'place of wrong'
governs, the court observed merely, "'We cannot determine what the
public policy of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts should be." c"
It is submitted that the only public policy of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts as to whether tort actions between New York spouses
will adversely affect domestic tranquility is merely to leave the issue
to New York law.
Perhaps a more common instance of the local policy of the internal
law affording a guide to its applicability to a Conflict of Laws problem
is the treatment of legislation limiting the activities of corporations.
Is the policy of the statute one to protect the owners of corporations
against fraudulent or ill-advised conduct by the management or some
similar hazard? Or is the policy one to protect the economy or other
interest of the community against the economic activities of corporations? If it is the former, presumably the policy does not extend to
policing foreign corporations for the benefit and protection of their
owners 19 whereas if it is the latter, protection of the local community
55. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF TIE CONFLCT OF LAWS, 243 ff. (1942).
57. Coster v. Coster, 289 N. Y. 438, 46 N.E. 2d 509 (1943).
58. Id. at 443, 46 N.E. 2d at 512.
59. Thus in Rumbough v. Southern Improvement Co., 106 N.C. 461, 11 S.E. 523
(1890), a local statute requiring corporate contracts involving liability in excess of a
stated amount to comply with certain formalities was held inapplicable to foreign car56.
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may be needed quite as much against foreign as against domestic corporations. 10 Similarly, in determining whether a statute of the state
of incorporation should limit the activities of the corporation in other
states, the policy of the act needs to be examined. If it is to regulate
the corporation, as such, it will be enforced regardless of where the activities took place. 61 But if the policy is to protect local interest against
the conduct of the corporation, it will be inapplicable to activities in
other states which in no way threaten such local interests. 02
Justice is always administered in particular situations which involve
particular litigants. Adjudication is concrete rather than abstract. It
is the business of courts therefore to administer the law in such a way
as to reach fair and just results between the particular litigants except
in situations where some paramount policy may require an undesirable
disposition of the immediate controversy. But by the very nature of
law, rules of conduct are formulated in terms of generalities. It may
be, therefore, that no body of law capable of tolerably accurate prediction could treat every particular case exclusively upon its individual
merits. In Conflict of Laws cases, situations are more than ordinarily
likely to arise in which the results in the particular cases may deviate
from the exact measure of justice which the tribunal would otherwise
administer.
On the other hand, there are many interstate situations in which the
tribunal will have a wider latitude in its search for a legal formula which
will meet the demands of justice in the problem before it. Subject to
other policy considerations, a court may with complete propriety, exploit the flexibility of the legal situation to produce a result in conformity with the merits of the case.
To the extent to which this policy is pursued, to that extent will the
"confusion of authority" and "contrariety of opinion" be continued if
not, indeed, extended. But once it is determined that uniformity of
legal relations, in the sense that the choice of forum will not formally
affect the result, is not attainable in the particular case or, if attainable,
is less desirable than the attainment of other policy objectives, the
porations entering into contracts in New York.
563, 35 N.E. 932 (1894).

See Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N.Y.

60. In Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 157 Ill. 284, 41 N.E. 765 (1895), a local
statute forbidding corporations from entering partnership contracts in the state was held
applicable to foreign as well as domestic corporations.
61. In Metropolitan Bank v. Godfrey, 23 Il1. 579 (1860), a New York statute regulating banks was held applicable to a New York bank's activities in Illinois,
62. In White v. Howard, 38 Conn. 342 (1871), a New York statute reflecting local
land policy was held inapplicable to prevent a New York corporation from acquiring land
by devise in Connecticut. In Warren v. First Nat. Bank of Columbus, 149 Ill. 9, 38 N.E.
122 (1893), a New York statute forbidding an assignment in contemplation of insolvency
by a corporation was held inapplicable to an assignment by a New York corporation
in Ohio.
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"confusion of authority" need not bother us. Indeed, it has not bothered courts for many years in dealing with a rule of foreign law which
was regarded as coming within the magic phrase "repugnant to the
public policy" of the forum.
The "public policy" formula is a striking instance of how courts have
thrown off the judicial inhibitions of the jurisdictional or territorial approach to the Conflict of Laws. Without a judicial scruple, a "foreign
created right" may be disregarded, sometimes with the most startling
results, 1 by the use of this technique. This escape from what would
be regarded as an improper or undesirable result has, perhaps, become
palatable because it is treated as an "exception" to the usual treatment.
Ordinarily, the "foreign created right" will be enforced. Such is the
general rule. If to do so, however, offends too greatly the local sense
of justice as reflected in the domestic law, the case will come within the
"exception" rather than the "rule." As everyone who is familiar with
the Conflict of Laws knows, this sort of treatment is so common that
it is, even with the courts which follow most faithfully the territorial
approach, almost fatal to that certainty and uniformity which the traditional theory is supposed to insure.
But the limitations of the "public policy" doctrine for obtaining justice in a Conflicts case are striking. In the first place, the policy of the
foreign law, as measured by the local law, is appraised in the abstract.
"The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleas63. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941) is a case in point. In this case the
Supreme Court held that under the rule of Erie v. Tompklns, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a
federal district court sitting in Texas must apply a Texas rule that a beneficiary under
an insurance policy could not receive the proceeds thereon if he had no "insurable interest" in the life of the insured. The case involved the rights of assignees of certain
beneficiaries who had been creditors of the insured. Practically the entire transaction
occurred in New York, under the law of which the assignees' claim vas valid. The deceased insured had been domiciled in Texas. The personal representatives of the decedent sued the insurance company to collect the portion of the proceeds of the policy
to which the estate of the decedent was entitled as beneficiary, and in addition, the portions which had been assigned by the original beneficiaries, on the theory that under
Texas law the assignees had no insurable interest and that in consequence, the personal
representative of the insured was entitled to their share. The district court had declined to apply the alleged Texas rule and had upheld the rights of the assignees who had
been interpleaded by the insurance company. The personal representatives of the decedent appealed and the Supreme Court reversed. It is to be noted that if, as the administrator insisted, the Texas rule denied recovery to the assignees and awarded their
portions of the proceeds of the policy to the administrator, the former have been denied
rights perfectly valid under New York law, -which under Conflict of Laws rules should
govern the transaction, although they in no way voluntarily subjected themselves to the
Texas law or to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts. They were summoned into court
solely by reason of the Federal Interpleader Act. Presumably if they had sued first in
a federal court sitting in New York the opposite result would have been reached. The
situation is apparently one which turns on the outcome of a race to the court house.
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ure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness." 64 The results of application of the foreign rule in the particular
case are unimportant. It is the supposed vice of the generalization
which justifies rejection.
The "public policy" doctrine would, it is submitted, be a more effective hand-maiden of justice if it were applied in the light of the facts
of the case before the court as an instrument to avoid an improper disposition of the particular dispute.
Again, it is to be observed that the principle can ordinarily be applied only negatively. It may be employed as a device not to decide the
case on its merits but seldom as a means of obtaining an affirmative adjudication. The parties are merely denied access to the local courts.
If the plaintiff can find a forum elsewhere, he may obtain enforcement
of his admittedly valid, though unjust "right." If, however, he is unable to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in a state which is willing
to make its judicial machinery available to him, his "right" will forever
be unenforceable. This is hardly a satisfactory situation. There is
something inadequate about a legal system which tolerates such negative results. In a civilized nation, a plaintiff ought not be sent from pillar to post to get a hearing on the merits of his claim. The policy, regarded so highly, of ending litigation 65 is offended, the plaintiff rather
than the defendant being the victim. 6
The question may be raised why the appraisal of different policies,
as a technique in the solution of Conflict of Laws cases, should be confined to the policy of the forum and that of some state which has a particular connection with the problem? Why should not the court consider the respective policies of the law of every state which is connected
with the situation in the light of each factual contact and the interest
that the state may have in the outcome of the case? Such a method
would lead to a search for that law of those potentially applicable which
would best meet the needs of the court in arriving at a just solution
of the individual controversy. 67
One may agree with Justice Cardozo that Conflict of Laws is a "field
64. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
65. It is litigation, and litigation of the most fruitless kind, when a dispute is carried to the highest court of a state only to be dismissed on the grounds that, although
the plaintiff has or may have a perfectly "valid" right, it offends the public policy of tle
forum and therefore will not be enforced. All the arguments against the doctrine of
"forum non conveniens" are applicable here with few or none of the factors present
which justify that doctrine.
66. The doctrine of res judicata protects the defendant against repeated and vexatious litigation. The "public policy" doctrine in the Conflict of Laws may require repeated actions by the plaintiff to obtain enforcement of his "valid" right, which is certainly "vexatious" to him and, if the statute of limitations expires, may prove fatal.
67. See Cavers, A Critique of fhe Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARy. L. Rtv, 173,
83-4 (1933).
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in the domain of the law where fundamental conceptions have been
developed to their uttermost conclusions by the organon of logic," and
that here "the finality of the rule is in itself a jural end." 11 This, however, need not mean that the law should hesitate to free itself from the
limitations of logic nor does it imply that finality is the only jural end.
There are other intellectual tools besides logic and other jural ends besides finality. All jural ends are but means to some further end in society and logic is not enough if it serves the intermediate but not the
ultimate end.
The truth is, however, that the deficiencies in Conflict of Laws are
not to be attributed so much to the use of logic as applied to "fundamental conceptions" as in the choice and limitations of the conceptions
to which it is applied. Indeed some that have been regarded as "fundamental" turn out to be nothing of the sort. What is needed is an expansion of the "fundamental conceptions" to include consideration of the
various policies pertinent to the problems dealt with.
Indication of a few of the policy factors which are, or may be, involved in Conflict of Laws cases is meant only to suggest some of the
avenues which are made available when the fetters of territoriality, the
"jurisdictional" approach and the Conflict of Laws mechanism based
thereon, are broken. It is clear that the legal horizon is vastly extended.
Human relations have become highly complicated and involved. The
administration of justice requires increasingly expanded paraphernalia
and continued refinement of equipment. What is more important, it
requires a deeper insight into the values which our social institutions
seek to attain. The appropriate decision of cases arising out of the Conflict of Laws requires, ultimately, the conscious resolution of the real
or imagined underlying conflict of social institutions. "The general
problem," as Professor Lorenzen observed many years ago, "is, therefore, always the same: What are the demands of justice in the particular
situation; what is the controlling policy?" C3

.68. CARWozo,

PARAmxEs OF LEAL SciENcE 67 (1928).
69. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Y.,M L. J.

736, 748 (1924).

